On the other hand, no one has asked how a code of professional ethics is to be practiced that does rely in the main on peer review with all its inherent problems.47 Contrary to what the philosophers might say, we are experiencing today a proliferation of ethics committees, which in some perspective actually stifle the progress of research and the production of new and original knowledge.48 I asked myself: who is the intended reader?49 Does this collection of essays help to overcome the "dialogue des sourds" between philosophers of history and historians? Who is likely to benefit from the meditations of the philosophers? The collection makes clear that history does not belong exclusively to the historians—fortunately. Historians, I think, should also focus on and defend that small space of freedom that allows for autonomous action, as Bourdieu insisted.50 I recommend this volume to "working" historians to stimulate their own thinking about their work—they can decide for themselves—and to break the almost incessant circle of philosophers of history talking entirely among themselves.

Richard Rorty doubted that philosophers can or should tell historians how to perform their tasks better.51 Wolf Lepenies once invoked the "moral sciences" in their "emphatic sense."52 John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, spoke of the moral sciences, and Mill would have counted history among the moral sciences. It is a term that has long fallen into disuse. The reasons for this oblivion would be interesting in themselves. Is then the renewed interest in a topic like the ethics of history a sign of a return to the concept of the moral sciences? If it were, the term would be used in a rather different sense than when, for example, the question was raised: "Is economics a moral science?" In this latter question there is a presupposition about clear knowledge of good and evil, while the notion of the moral sciences—going back to the distinction in classical rhetoric—suggests no more and no less that these are dealing with agency and phenomena that are subject to judgments in terms of good and evil.

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52. Wolf Lepenies, Bestimmte und Desorientier (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), 17.

THE HORROR OF ETHNOCENTRISM: WESTERNIZATION, CULTURAL DIFFERENCE, AND STRIFE IN UNDERSTANDING NON-WESTERN PASTS IN HISTORICAL STUDIES


One of the most important questions in historical thinking today is: can the established form of history as an academic discipline cope with non-Western parts? Or does it—on the contrary—alienate them by putting them into a pattern of understanding that fails to meet their peculiarities? Missing peculiarity means robbing the non-Western civilizations of their authenticity and dignity. Exactly this is Fuglesiad's provocative thesis: history in its Western form is thoroughly ethnocentric and thus has to be given up in order to do justice to all non-Western pasts.

This thesis fits into the current mainstream of historical thinking in its intercultural dimension. Here the opinion prevails—at least in the non-Western world—that modern historical thinking is Western historical thinking, and as such it is unable to understand the history of non-Western peoples. It is accused of imposing on them a scheme of what history is about that is derived from the development of the West, and thus it essentially fails to understand the difference of all those countries and peoples that followed different paths in the temporal course of the human world. Therefore, the dominance of this modern, Western history has to be toppled, and new ways of understanding the human past in its variety and heterogeneity have to be developed.

This is how historical studies is confronted with the challenge of globalization: in its globalized form as an academic discipline it is losing more and more credibility. Why? In the increasingly dense communication among different cultural life forms history is where cultural difference is articulated as a condition of mental survival in the realm of human identity-formation. Globalization exercises its unifying force so that the mental procedures of identity-formation are put under growing pressure to maintain the differences that are so intimate and powerful in the core of the human mind. Without difference, no identity, and without identity, no human life. This simple formula explains the depths and intellectual vigor of the struggle about history that characterizes the humanities and social sciences. Postmodernism, postcolonialism, subalternism, and (recently) (in)fusionism are some of the armes in this battle.

1. I would like to dedicate this essay to Teresa de Rendeze Martins as a small gift for her sixtieth birthday and as an expression of my gratitude for more than thirty years cooperation in theory of history and for a wonderful friendship.
The dominant response in today's discourse is to dissolve the constraints of an established discipline, to replace history with anthropology, to attack the concept of history as such (identified as a means of suppression and domination), to replace method by poetics and rhetorics, and to negate any principle of universal validity crossing cultural differences in understanding and interpreting cultural matters. These are some strategies in fighting the enemy.

Fuglestad's book has a clear-cut position in this struggle. It accuses Western historical thinking of pursuing a fundamental ethnocentric attitude that allows no place for understanding and recognizing non-Western cultures and life forms with their specific and peculiar treatnamas of the past. Is it thought to leave no air for the breath of their identities.

To give this accusation plausibility Fuglestad presents an overview of Western historical thinking from its beginnings until today. He refers to historiography, historical studies, and philosophy of history in a comprehensive way. He has the courage to reflect profoundly on principles, ideas, concepts, and long-term developments, and he does so in a sympathetic, open-minded, and challenging way. His book is based on a deep concern for the dignity of non-Western traditions and life forms. (To my mind this is a very typical Western attitude, since it belongs to the inbuilt morality of modern Western historical thinking as I understand it.)

In the first two chapters Fuglestad explicates the problem. It is paradigmatically indicated by Hugh Trevor-Roper's statement that black Africa has no history (10). For a professor for African history like Finn Fuglestad this is a serious challenge indeed. This statement is based on a concept of history that refers to the development of Western civilization and, at the same time, in its academic form as an established discipline that claims universal validity. Two attitudes are synthesized: a reference to one single peculiar history and a widening of its scope to encompass history in general. This synthesis constitutes ethnocentrism as a logical principle of historical sense-generation.

Fuglestad convincingly defines ethnocentrism as "turning self-worth into an absolute, or if one prefers, the (unwarranted) establishment of the specific values of one's own society as universal values" (18). The whole book tries to demonstrate that the academically established form of history is constituted by such ethnocentrism in its specific form as Eurocentrism. Since it universalizes the Western experience and understanding of its development to categories of history as such, it excludes all other categories of experiencing and understanding temporal change in the human world. By doing so, it may understand its own past, but not at all the pasts of other people who live in other patterns of cultural orientation. Furthermore, by claiming to be the only rational and "scientific" interpretation of the human past, the specific history of the West is universalized into history in general. Thus non-Western pasts are eliminated from the realm of history, or— even worse—Western patterns of interpretation that strictly run against the self-understanding of the people of concern are imposed on their history.

In the first case non-Western pasts are defined by a lack of the very feature of civilization created by the West. In the second case non-Westerners are denied permission to use their own established cultural orientations, which substantially differ from the Western one, in order to express their peculiarities. They are de-
to interpretation the otherness of non-Western pasts vanishes. It is forced into Clio’s garments, which are, of course, of Western fashion. Interpretation—as it is committed to the categorical or theoretical presupposition of what history is about—stresses what the events of the past mean for “us” (in the established Western cognitive system). What it has meant for the people of this past and for their offspring has fallen into an epistemological abyss: it is the gap between different worldviews or cultural codes, which are neither reflected nor bridged in the reigning historical discourse.

Fugestad’s argumentation unearthed a remarkable fact: the close relationship between the professional historian’s empirical work when using his or her specialized competence for non-Western history on the one hand, and the basic Western philosophical concept of history on the other. This connection is all the more powerful as it is not realized or reflected on by those who pursue it in their daily work as scholars. Professionalism usually is blind to fundamental theoretical questions; the professionals don’t see the forest for the trees.

Chapter V shows that the power of the Western paradigm is even reproduced by those historians (like Cheikh Anta Diop and others) who want to break the Western dominance and replace Eurocentrism by Afrocentrism. The results of these attempts may have gained some cultural credit from Africans, but academically they are not convincing at all. As long as empirical evidence plays a role in historical thinking, Fugestad puts this in a very polite manner: “it contains in my view many assertions that are not always compatible with the facts as we know them” (83). The reason for this failure consists of a kind of logical tragedy in the replacement of a Western without a non-Western (here: an African) perspective. In this process of exchanging one ethnocentrism for another, the main features of the paradigm for history are (unintentionally) reproduced: “Where they differ is that they agree and try to show that the so-called ‘achievements’ of Western Civilization were not the achievements of that Civilization at all, but of people from Black Africa...” (83). In this way the peculiarity of non-Western pasts remains out of consideration.

Chapter VI looks at present-day discourses for an alternative to this destructive reproduction of the Western paradigm. The starting point is in Fugestad’s diagnosis of the “theoretical poverty” (91) of historical studies of today. He does not find a convincing alternative. Postmodernism may support his criticism of the traditional Western concept of history, but it does not meet the challenges he has described. For him the Subaltern School is on the right track, but its perspective is too narrow and it has not yet brought about a theoretical concept that can replace the dominant Western one. I would like to generalize this finding: the Western paradigm of history—as it is effective in historical studies all over the world—has rightly generated a lot of criticism of its inbuilt ethnocentrism, but there is no convincing new paradigm in sight.

Nor does Fugestad succeed in articulating such an alternative (though as we shall see, he attempts but fails to do so in his last chapter). It is not even clear whether he wants one. On the one hand he pleads for a multitude of theoretical concepts according to the multitude of cultures in history: every culture “should feel free to develop its own theories and frameworks” (97), but this runs against his professional commitment to the principle of validity and analytical clarity. Postmodern relativism seems to run against his disciplinary professionalism. Therefore, on the other hand he states that universal history, which is not meta-history in the Hegelian-Trevor-Roperian sense, is both possible and unavoidable, and that we must stand up to challenge of a global perspective...” (121).

In order to start going some way in this direction Fugestad identifies some theoretical problems that would have to be solved by the new paradigm. One is religion. Fugestad observes a general failure to recognize religion as a powerful factor in human life forms of the past (not only of non-Western civilizations). His impression of the established historical discourse is that it has inscribed modern secularization into the paradigm of historical thinking. Religion as a main force of human culture has been replaced by economics. (Capitalism seems to have subjugated historical culture even on the level of its basic assumptions.) However, I do not see this one-sidedness in the Western tradition of the humanities. I only see one-sidedness in Fugestad’s concept of Western historical thinking: Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch, and Emil Duerkheim—just to mention a few, but very influential, scholars who have recognized the power of religion in history—are not mentioned. They were not historians, but that they represent the Western understanding of culture and history cannot be denied.

It is another question whether religion has to become not just the object of historical research but a constitutive part of the sense-generating patterns of historical interpretation. Fugestad does not thematize the secular character of modern historical studies as such. So the question is open whether religion should be brought back into the philosophy of history in order to enable historical thinking to cope with non-Western pasts and the role religion has played there. I think that Fugestad’s professionalism would not let him go this far.

Another important issue is treated in chapter VII: the concept of time. Fugestad follows the traditional typological distinction: Western historical thinking is dominated by a linear time concept, non-Western is not. With their nonlinear time concept non-Western civilizations fundamentally differ from the West. This is the main reason (besides the importance of religion) why non-Western civilizations are alien and incompatible with the Western cognitive scheme of history. Within this scheme they are treated as ahistorical.

Can this fundamental difference in time concepts be overcome? For me, this distinction between linear and nonlinear is too abstract. In fact, both dimensions of time occur in all cultures. Therefore, it is rather useless to decide between an either-or; instead, we should look at the constellations of time dimensions in different cultures—even more concretely—in different forms of narration in re-presenting the past and characterize their differences with them.

In his last chapter Fugestad has the courage to outline a comprehensive concept of universal history within which non-Western pasts find a place and non-

2. Sunjay Seth has radicalized this challenge of modern historical thinking by tackling religion as an element of historical sense-generation and not only as an object of study. Sunjay Seth, "Religion or Reasoning? Clio or Shiva?", Social Text 78, 22:1 (2004), 85-101.

Western civilizations are granted their peculiarity. Such an approach promises to overcome the inhumanity of Western historical thinking. But, unfortunately, this promise is not fulfilled. Fuglestads simply calls us the traditional master-narrative of the making of the modern world when forced into being by capitalism. "In brief, the Western expansion, including imperialism and colonialism, turned out from a certain point of view to be a resounding success story, possibly the major success story, it the history of mankind, sweeping away almost everything before it, and imposing the Western model everywhere" (125). Fuglestads narrative of modernization is new insofar as it reverses its evaluation in contrast to traditional Western self-esteem about the achievements of modernity. In Fuglestads narrative the West's triumph is not a success story, but a narrative of a disaster, the "partial or total destruction of the 'traditional' cultures of Africa..." (125). So at the end, Fuglestads alternative to Western ethnocentrism is a negative ethnocentrism in the name of the non-Western civilizations. Is this a turning point in conceptualizing history?

Logically this question finds a positive answer with respect to Fuglestads book. In order to overcome a powerful concept of historical thinking it has to be fundamentally criticized. Its validity in cultural orientation must be dissolved along with criticism of such a dissolution. Fuglestads joins the already numerous thinkers who use destructive criticism aimed at cleansing the intellectual field for a new mode of thinking about history. But, at the end of his book, Fuglestads offers something more positive, a hint at what this new mode must be:

The duty of the historian is...to return to a program many philosophers and historians have advocated, but very few have attempted to realize: To abstract from the present values and norms and to attempt to perceive each and every period and each and every culture/civilization in its own light, to unearth what it was, and without nostalgia, both the worlds we have lost and those we have not. (139)

This postulate is supposedly the positive result of Fuglestads essentially negative, critical argumentation against Western historical thinking. As such it is astonishing, indeed. Where does it come from? Fuglestads does not give us any hint, neither historically nor systematically. Is it new? Does it transcend the Western tradition of historical thinking and is it inspired by non-Western cultures? My answer to all these questions is a clear no. What Fuglestads presents is the very traditional idea of classical Western historicism, represented by nobody else but Ranke (who together with Hegel plays the role of the intellectual enemy for Fuglestads). When Ranke said that every epoch is immediate to God, 4 he had in mind that the past should never be understood in the conceptual framework of the present, thus repudiating the Enlightenment concept of progress as well as giving back the past its "Eigenschaft" (meaning in itself). Even Ranke's famous words "Wir es eigentlich gesehen" [as it really was as such] are marvelously echoed by Fuglestads: "as it were;" only the word "eigentlich" is omitted. In Ranke's text this "eigentlich" represents his whole philosophy of history, which is, of course, not free from Western ethnocentrism, but which has theoretical implications that lead exactly to the point. What Fuglestads has in mind as the beginning of a new way of doing history has already been conceived as a potential in the Western concept of history that he opposes. However, his criticism of its ethnocentric elements has prevented him from realizing this potential and allows him to attribute to it a rather one-sided theoretical form. I think that this one-sidedness is the result of a rather narrow historical perspective on Western historiography; it emphasizes the Anglo-Saxon tradition, more or less eclipsing the specifically continental one.

At the end of his book Fuglestads refers to a rule of termeneutics that has accompanied Western historical thinking from the very beginning of its modernization. But in his description of the Western paradigm we do not find a single word on "Verstehen" and the tradition of hermeneutics, which belongs to the core of Western historical culture, at least in some of its manifestations, a tradition represented by Herder, Schleiermacher, Droysen, Dilthey, Max Weber, and more recently by A. Schütz, T. Berger, and Thomas Luckmann (just to name a few). Nor is there any word about any of the approaches of modern historicism since the end of the eighteenth century that consider cultural diversity; that criticize understanding the past in the framework of present-day cognitive patterns; that criticize colonization, modernization, and the category of progress; or that express interest in difference, peculiarity, and diversity. 5 This one-sidedness can be easily proved by a look at the bibliography: no Droysen, Rickert, Dilthey, Weber, Troeltsch, Koselleck, or Ankersmit (to mention only a few who have presented a concept of history that is much more open to cultural difference and diversity than those concepts to which Fuglestads refers). The remarkable attempts of Shmuel Eisenstadt and others to multiply modernity and to dissolve the traditional understanding of modernization as Westernization are not referred to at all. 6 This is all the more remarkable, as in the "Axial Time Theory," which has been an issue in Western historical thinking for decades now, religion plays a decisive role in conceptualizing civilizations and developing universal periodizations.

The constraints of history understood as the teleology of Western civilization have already been broken, and new perspectives on universal history have been opened within which humankind does not appear to be dominated by the West. In current intercultural discussions the idea of history presents a multitude of develops.


opments and interrelationships—a worthwhile philosophical endeavor for conceptualizing universal history beyond a simple negation of Western ethnocentrism.

Moreover, Fuglestad's problems are greater than simple omission. His way out of the "gigantic drama" of Western destruction of non-Western traditions is itself a problem, not a solution. To interpret past life forms by using their own cognitive patterns supposedly means to give the people of the past the dignity of their own voices in today's historical culture. At the same time, their offspring can find themselves in this culture in a non-alienated way. But this is good old Western hermeneutics (is there any non-Western example of the extent of curiosity for otherness and its attempts to understand it?). But it would be naïve to think that this is easily possible. On the contrary: no historian can leave his or her time and dive into the depths of otherness. He or she always takes him or herself along into the encounter with historical difference. The impact of identity cannot be avoided in historical thinking.

For a long time ethnocentrism has been the logic of this impact. But this logic can be changed or at least modified. A plurality of ethnocentrism is a wrong concept: it negates any claim for validity in intercultural communication. Instead of recognition, it is only able to promote tolerance, where otherness remains alien and is not realized as a matter of a discursive movement between self and others.

Where, then, is the starting point for overcoming Western ethnocentrism and for avoiding non-Western negative ethnocentrism and cultural relativism? I agree with Fuglestad that we have to work on the foundations of historical thinking, and that we need a new philosophy of history. Such a new philosophy should keep up the established universalism of historical sense criteria, but their exclusive character should be changed into an inclusive one. This is possible by keeping in mind the starting point of historical nationalism: humankind as a normative and empirical dimension of history at the same time. Empirically, humankind covers all pasts, Western and non-Western together. Normatively, humankind should be understood as the "cultural nature" of human life. Referring to this cultural nature seeds a regulative idea, which is valid for the sake of one's own identity, and for the sake of the otherness of others as well, without ethnocentrically unbalanced evaluations.

Immanuel Kant, one of the great figures of Western philosophical modernity and one of the pioneers of modern philosophy of history, made an impressive (and still valid) proposal for such a rule: that every human being should be treated as an end for him- or herself and not only as a means for the ends of others. When this rule is applied to the diversity of human parts and explicated in a concept of the temporal changes in humankind from its very beginning until today, a historical humanism can be established. At least intellectually it may end the "gigantic drama" of Western ethnocentrism. It is committed to the Western tradition, and it ascribes its highest value to all non-Western cultures: human dignity.

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